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How to Make Army Force Generation Work  
for the Army's Reserve Components

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FOR THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS**

**Joseph E. Whitlock**

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## PREFACE

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## ABSTRACT

The Army needs to implement Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in addition to its ongoing transformation and move to a more modular force. To achieve a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary qualities fully, the Army must do so quickly, while also keeping its Reserve Components full partners throughout this process. Without ARFORGEN, the Army will continue to be challenged seriously or even be unable to fulfill its current global force requirements. Fully integrating the Army's RCs into ARFORGEN is essential and critical for the Army to succeed.

This paper describes ARFORGEN, discusses some of its critical assumptions related to RC units, and explains what changes are required at the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Army (DA), and the individual RC levels so that the Army can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN. The paper details needed changes at both the institutional and operational levels at DA and DoD.

DA institutional change includes improving the structure, equipping, training, manning, and resourcing functions related to RC units. The institutional Army also must synchronize other well-established institutional processes with ARFORGEN. The operational Army must improve communication with the institutional Army, develop robust automation support for all aspects of ARFORGEN, and increase planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for RC units.

Needed DoD institutional change includes providing the Army better and more timely mobilization strategic guidance; focusing DoD implementation policy on the long-term requirements needed to fight a long war; focusing less on individual servicemember and RC unit management issues; and providing additional resources to the Army's RCs. DoD operational change includes communicating better with the institutional chain of command and working to establish a well-defined system to manage and execute its joint force provider responsibilities.



# HOW TO MAKE ARMY FORCE GENERATION WORK FOR THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS

## INTRODUCTION

### The Strategic Context and Modern Use of the Reserve Components.

The traditional, visible distinction between war and peace is less clear at the start of the 21st century. In a long war, the United States expects to face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.


*Quadrennial Defense Review Report<sup>1</sup>*

Over the last 2 decades, our nation has moved from using its Reserve Components (RCs) as a strategic reserve to an operational reserve that is critical to accomplishing the day-to-day requirements of our national security. Certainly, the reliance on the RCs was on the rise prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Beginning with the first Gulf War buildup in 1990 and through the subsequent post-Cold War draw down years until now, the RCs increasingly and routinely have been called upon to support war, peacetime missions, and other foreign and domestic contingencies. The RCs of America's Armed Forces are in greater demand today than at any time since World War II. This overall demand, depicted in Figure 1 as millions of duty days performed by the RCs, demonstrates how this demand has been on a steady rise since the late 1980s.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. Armed Forces, both its active and RCs, have been extremely taxed since the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Moreover, these increased demands are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. As Lewis Sorley, a noted scholar of American military history, wrote, "What seems undeniable is that for whatever reasons – fiscal, political, or strategic – the nation is unwilling to maintain an active force that is adequate to current missions and operational tempo."<sup>3</sup> Sorley goes on to say that as a consequence, the RCs "not only supplement or reinforce the active force but often act as a surrogate for it" and that doing so "stands the concept of Reserve forces on its head."<sup>4</sup> This paper will not enter into this ongoing debate. Rather, it is premised on there being no significant increase or decrease in the size of the Army's active or two RCs. The paper, however, will illuminate that, to make effective use of its RCs, and particularly the Army's RCs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) must focus more resources on the Army and make a number of policy changes to make the Army's RCs more accessible and readily deployable.

In response to the sharply increased demands over the last 4 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has articulated consistently that it desires to move the services' RCs from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. In actuality, DoD has been deploying the RCs like an operational reserve for years now. Noticeably lacking in DoD's desire to have an operational reserve, though, are the corresponding new policies, directives, and budget required for it to function as such. Essentially, DoD's new operational reserve is still being managed by Cold War-era policies, directives, and systems – all designed and implemented when the RCs were still viewed as a strategic reserve. Most policies and practices governing the RCs have failed to keep pace with the rising use and changing nature of reserve service. They need to move away quickly from the Industrial Age and into the Information Age. DoD also must provide the services a sufficient degree of strategic guidance, while focusing less on individual RC servicemember management issues, so that the services can manage their RCs effectively.





**Figure 1. Total Force Reserve Components Contributions Over Time Expressed in Millions (M) of Duty Days.**

This means providing the services new, clear, and timely policies for their RCs, as well as increased management flexibility, so they can truly function as an operational reserve. Otherwise, individual service efforts to “operationalize” their reserve components will only be of marginal benefit. For the last 4 years, this has been an especially crucial need for the Army to employ effectively and efficiently the Army Reserve and Army National Guard in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) – what has now become known as the long war.

### **Service Composition and Size Does Matter.**

The Army, both its active and RCs, has been called upon more than any other service since 9/11. The Army, the largest of all the services, has a greater percentage of its total Selected Reserve manpower in its two RCs (53 percent) than its active component (47 percent).<sup>5</sup> As depicted in Figure 2, this differs significantly from any of the others, where no service even comes close to having a majority of its manpower in the reserve.<sup>6</sup> The Air Force, a distant second, has only 34 percent of its total manpower in its two reserve components.

The Army also has far many more soldiers in its Selected Reserve than any other service, as seen in Figure 3. Since 1994 the Army alone has accounted for over 65 percent of the total Selected Reserve manpower strength. In other words, the combined total of all other Selected Reserve servicemembers in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps comprises just over half of that serving in the Army’s Selected Reserve. At the end of fiscal year 2004, the Army had a total of 547,049 soldiers serving in the Selected Reserve as compared to a grand total of only 304,346 in all the other services combined (Navy 82,558, Air Force 182,144, Marine Corps 39,644).<sup>7</sup> This trend is clear, as seen in Figure 4, and is not expected to change.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, over 72 percent of the total number of troops mobilized from all of the services’ reserve components since 9/11 have come from the Army.<sup>9</sup> In the long war ahead, the Army has the




Figure 2. Percentages of Active versus Selected Reserve Manpower in Each Service.





Figure 3. Fiscal Year 2006 Authorized Service Strength Indicated by Selected Reserve Component.

most compelling need, as well as the most to gain, in both supporting DoD's efforts to move the RCs from a strategic to operational reserve while also pursuing its own initiatives, which will be discussed next.

### Recent Army Initiatives.

Over the last decade, the Army has been in a continuous transformation. The Army Campaign Plan is the overarching document that provides the guiding direction for this most recent period of transformation. It describes how both the institutional and operational Army is changing in a number of ways to meet the nation's national security requirements.<sup>10</sup> The Department of the Army (DA) is pursuing aggressively many initiatives to better posture itself to fight a long war. These include

## Selected Reserve Strength by Service



**Figure 4. Selected Reserve Strength by Service from Fiscal Year 1994 to 2004.**

increasing the size of the operational Army while decreasing the institutional Army, building a modular force based on brigade combat teams, planning for future modernization through development of Future Combat Systems and other advanced technologies, and also by implementing Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). The total size of the active Army will not likely change as it implements these initiatives. Most of these initiatives are focused and integrated across all three components of the Army, and completing any one of them is a multiyear endeavor that depends on both the nation's and DoD's resources and support.

Of all these initiatives, it is imperative that the Army quickly and completely implement ARFORGEN. Without ARFORGEN, the Army will continue to be challenged seriously or even unable to fulfill its global force requirements. Fully integrating the Army's RCs into ARFORGEN is essential for ARFORGEN to succeed.

The purpose of ARFORGEN is to generate a pool of rapidly deployable Army forces continuously, from all three of the Army's components—Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—to meet the worldwide requirements of civil authorities and combatant commanders via a managed, cyclic process. The Army refers to ARFORGEN as a model, but it could be better thought of as a process and forum to plan, manage, prioritize, and allocate limited resources to meet all worldwide Army force requirements. In June 2005, the Army leadership approved the use of ARFORGEN and designated Forces Command (FORSCOM) as the executive agent.<sup>11</sup>

Since the start of the GWOT over 4 years ago, the Army's worldwide force requirements consistently have been out of balance with its current force capabilities. In other words, total annual force requirements have exceeded the supply and capability to generate the numbers and types of trained and readily available forces needed under ideal ARFORGEN conditions. This imbalance is not anticipated to change in the near future. The result has been that many units, both AC and RC, have been called upon multiple times in a short period of time to support the war effort.

### Problem Statement.

Because the Army's RCs comprise such a large percentage of overall Army forces, the Army will not be able to fulfill its worldwide force requirements by implementing ARFORGEN for active component

(AC) units alone. Fully to achieve a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary qualities, the Army must institute ARFORGEN quickly, while also keeping its RCs full partners throughout this process. In order for ARFORGEN to work for the RCs, the Army requires both institutional and operational change, not only within DA but also at the DoD level. This paper describes ARFORGEN and explains what changes are required at the DoD, DA, and the individual RC levels so that the Army can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN.

The paper begins with a brief but necessary description of ARFORGEN and some critical assumptions that pertain to the RCs. Next, it addresses the need to make institutional and operational changes within the individual RCs, at DA, and then DoD. At each of these levels, the current situation is described, and specific recommendations are offered. The paper concludes with a summary of these recommendations, all of which must be implemented in order for the Army to integrate its RCs in ARFORGEN fully.

## **ARFORGEN**

### **What is ARFORGEN?**

The Army defines ARFORGEN as "the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements."<sup>12</sup> ARFORGEN is designed to work for both the Army's AC and two RCs. All units progress through a series of three successive force pools: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available. Units move through the Reset/Train and Ready force Pools based only on an event, not time. The Available Force Pool is the only time-based pool, where a unit will remain available for up to 1 year for deployment, if not deployed sooner. As early in the process as possible, ARFORGEN focuses units in both the AC and RCs on future missions and then task organizes them into one of three Expeditionary Force Packages: the Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF), Ready Expeditionary Force (REF), or Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF). Figure 5 is a graphic depiction of how units flow through the ARFORGEN process.<sup>13</sup> After deployment, or 1 year in the available force pool, all units are returned to the Reset/Train pool where this cyclic process begins again.

The goal for how fast a particular unit moves through this ARFORGEN cyclic rotation is different for the AC and RCs. For an AC unit, it is one deployment in every 3 years. For an RC unit, it is one deployment in every 6 years.<sup>14</sup> However, in many instances this cycle also depends on the type and availability of forces in demand from combatant commanders or civil authorities. For example, a military police company is considered a high demand/low density (HD/LD) unit, so high worldwide demands for these relatively few type units may require them to move through this ARFORGEN cyclic rotation at a much faster rate. Ongoing changes to the Army's force structure will address these problems to an extent. Nevertheless, Army force requirements are expected to remain high for several years, so these HD/LD force gaps are still several years away from being resolved.<sup>15</sup>

### **Implementing ARFORGEN.**

In September 2005 the Army published the second change to its Army Campaign Plan. This change added ARFORGEN implementation as one of the campaign's major objectives. It also directed that ARFORGEN be implemented no later than fiscal year 2006, and designated the FORSCOM commander as the supported commander for implementation and the Army G-3 as the lead for policy.<sup>16</sup> In March 2006, the Army G-3 further refined this objective by issuing a planning directive that assigned responsibilities




Figure 5. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model.

and a timeline for preparation and approval of the Army's ARFORGEN Implementation Plan. This directive stated that the Army would implement ARFORGEN over the next several years in three phases: the Current State, the Bridging State, and the Objective State.<sup>17</sup>

It is critical that the Army establish the ARFORGEN model concurrently for both AC and RC units during all three of these phases so that it can continue to meet all operational requirements. Not doing so will cause the RCs to continue operating in a crisis management mode, with increasingly fewer soldiers, equipment, and units available for deployment. Moreover, the institutional and operational Army will not have incorporated the necessary changes needed to support the RCs. The combination of these two effects will cause the RCs to falter and become unable to provide a continuous stream of citizen-soldiers to support the long war. In turn, this would create a situation where deploying units would be comprised almost entirely of AC units and troops, and without citizen-soldiers, the public awareness and support for this long war will dwindle.<sup>18</sup>

### Validating ARFORGEN Critical Assumptions.

In developing the initial ARFORGEN design, FORSCOM made some base assumptions that were obviously not within its control. The following three are critical assumptions that pertain to the RCs:

1. Under Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC), the Army has assured, predictable access to RC forces in the Available Force Pool;
2. The RCs can man units at Force Pool standards; and,
3. Institutional processes will support ARFORGEN.<sup>19</sup>

ARFORGEN will not work for the RCs unless these three FORSCOM assumptions prove to be valid. The Army is working diligently to change institutional processes and validate FORSCOM's third assumption; however, it will be difficult for the Army to validate FORSCOM's second assumption,

and impossible for it to validate their first. Only senior leaders in DoD will be able to validate the first assumption of assured and predictable access to RC forces.

The Army has since formulated 11 of its own ARFORGEN planning assumptions. Similarly, the following two are critical assumptions pertaining to the RCs:

1. The Army will organize, man, train, equip, source, mobilize, and deploy cohesive AC and RC units to meet operational requirements and support civil authorities; and,
2. The Army will continue to have assured, predictable access to RC units to meet future operational requirements for continuous operations.<sup>20</sup>

The Army is working to validate its first assumption through a series of deliberate actions that are best represented in the lines of operation, decision points, and many objectives in the Army Campaign Plan. Once again, only DoD can validate that the Army has assured, predictable access to its RC units, no matter what specific mobilization authorities are used to do so. ARFORGEN will not work for RC units unless it does. The following paragraphs expand on these two important ARFORGEN assumptions.

*Assumption 1 – Manning RC Units.* Of the many tasks associated with Army's first assumption, clearly the most difficult challenge for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard will be manning their units with trained and qualified soldiers. Excessive soldier cross-leveling into deploying units over the last 4 years, the geographic constraints associated with assigning citizen-soldiers to units, low full-time support (FTS) manning, and the chronic and growing shortages in company grade officers across both RCs are all very serious problems affecting the RCs' ability to man units. Additionally, manning RC units has been further complicated by an absence of direction on what long-term mobilization authority will be in effect, and by policies and other actions that overly restrict access RC soldiers.

*Assumption 2 – Obtaining Assured, Predictable Access to RC Units.* FORSCOM's working definition of "assured access" is as follows:

The approved legislative authority, policy guidance, and DoD procedures in place (and approved) which allows and guarantees access to the Reserve Component (RC) units in the Available Force Pool for rapid mobilization in support of national military requirements. It is the ability to source, mobilize, and deploy cohesive RC units within the ARFORGEN process.<sup>21</sup>

Access to RC units is anything but assured in today's environment. This may have been acceptable years ago in a peacetime environment, but assured access is an unavoidable necessity now during a protracted war. Currently, adequate policy guidance is not in place during the early planning and sourcing phases. Much later, during operational execution, the previously approved mobilization authority is overly managed and scrutinized at both DA and DoD during the staffing for approval of each RC unit alert and mobilization order. This continues to be a very tedious, inefficient, and cumbersome process despite recent efforts to automate and provide secure web-based access to it. Ideally, FORSCOM should be able to approve and publish RC unit alert and mobilization orders once a mobilization authority is approved, and DoD and DA have published clear supporting policy guidance on the use of RC units and soldiers. Minimally, DA should be able to approve these actions.

ARFORGEN planning horizons require sufficient policy guidance, procedures, and systems all to be in place early on to achieve assured and predictable access to its RC units. For example, other than policy prohibiting it, DoD has not developed nor published any clear remobilization or dwell time policies for RC units or soldiers, despite the nation being over 4 years into this long war. The absence of these policies will hinder any attempt to implement an ARFORGEN process that is designed to source, resource, train, mobilize, and deploy cohesive RC units.

The urgent need for immediate DoD action for ARFORGEN to be implemented and work for the Army's RCs looms large over this entire process. DoD needs to validate Army's critical assumption

of continued assured, predictable access now and provide timely policy guidance that supports it; however, these are not the only changes needed. The next section identifies institutional and operational changes required at all levels so that RC units actually can become an operational reserve that is more accessible and more readily deployable.

## MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGE NEEDED FOR ARFORGEN

[Operation] IRAQIFREEDOM showed that there is room to improve Reserve and Guard readiness and mobilization. Because the war on terrorism will likely take a long time to win, we need to be as predictable as we can in call-ups; we owe that to the Guardsmen and women and Reservists, their families, and their employers. This is also a recruiting and retention concern. More predictability – where we can be predictable – is therefore important on many levels.

General Richard B. Myers  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>22</sup>

General Myers wrote these remarks in the December 2004 *Joint Force Quarterly* journal, an issue that was devoted almost entirely to the future of reserve forces. His remarks span the range of issues confronting the U.S. military at all levels, from DoD, to DA, and down to the individual RCs. How senior leaders in the military choose to address and resolve these issues also is fundamental to the future of sustaining the all-volunteer force because they heavily impact the decision of individual citizen-soldiers to serve.

While RC units have been employed like an operational reserve for years now, RC management practices are still locked in the old strategic reserve context of the Cold War. DoD polices consistently have limited RC management practices across all services. This is especially hurtful to the Army and its RCs. As shown earlier, the Army's RCs are far larger than any other service, they comprise a greater percentage of the total Army, are predominantly organized as stand alone units, and, along with the Marines, are the most heavily taxed service in the GWOT. This is in contrast to all other service RCs that are not nearly as large, comprise much less than half of the total manpower in that particular service, and, with few exceptions, are organized mostly as augmented or integrated multicomponent units. Additionally, the Army's individual RCs are rather limited in their ability to affect meaningful change in the institutional and operational Army. Both DA and DoD need to revamp management, as well as integrate and synchronize institutional and operational changes to implement ARFORGEN fully for RC units. The subsequent sections of this paper detail what each organization needs to accomplish so that Army RC management practices reflect the way the nation employs its operational reserve force. It also expands the discussion on those critical ARFORGEN assumptions of manning RC units and obtaining assured, predictable access to RC units.

## CHANGE IN THE INDIVIDUAL RESERVE COMPONENTS

Historically, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were only considered part-time forces. They were manned and equipped according to a tiered readiness system whereby a select few units would be manned and equipped fully at high levels (now often referred to as "eagles"), and all the remaining units (affectionately known as "ducks") were left undermanned and underequipped. Both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have undertaken sweeping initiatives to change so that they are better able to meet Army requirements. The Army Reserve's 5-year and National Guard's 6-year rotational plans for their respective units essentially came about as a result of almost perpetual crisis management since 9/11.<sup>23</sup> These rotational plans may even be the genesis behind the Army's decision to move to ARFORGEN. Several years ago, the Chief of the Army Reserve, Chief of the National Guard

Bureau, and Director of the Army National Guard realized the compelling reasons for quick change and also knew that doing nothing would be a recipe for disaster.<sup>24</sup>

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard, however, do not have the ability to make significant changes in the institutional and operational Army on their own. To be successful, they need support, resources, and authority from DA and DoD. Their greatest successes since 9/11 have been changing the culture and expectations associated with reserve service in the 21st century, working to eliminate excessive RC unit structure that far exceeded authorized end strength, rebalancing force structure, and most importantly, making ready for deployment literally hundreds of thousands of soldiers in their mobilizing units. For the most part, these units were previously only funded for low readiness levels and were chronically short of soldiers and equipment when asked to mobilize. The RCs readied these units for deployment primarily by cross-leveling other soldiers and equipment from nonmobilizing units into these mobilizing units. For example, from September 2001 through March 2005, the Army Reserve mobilized about 118,270 soldiers. Of that total number mobilized, about 53,000 (or 45 percent) were cross-leveled to fill shortages in mobilizing units. Similarly, from September 2001 to April 2005, the Army Reserve transferred about 235,900 pieces of equipment among units.<sup>25</sup>

Focusing on the immediate needs of units called to mobilize decreased the readiness and cohesion of those remaining units. Later, in subsequent rotations, these depleted units also were called to mobilize, so the personnel and equipment cross-leveling process repeated itself. Each time this cross-leveling process took place, it continued to shrink the pool of remaining manpower and available equipment, while also increasing strategic risk to the nation and the specific risk associated with deploying a fully trained and cohesive RC unit on time to meet the combatant commander's requirement. Another problem is that a large portion of the equipment deployed in early rotations to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) also was retained in theater for use by other units from the AC, RC, and even other services. This left those RC units with no equipment to train on when they returned home, or use as part of an unforeseen homeland security or homeland defense mission. Additionally, in the ensuing 4 years since 9/11, many citizen-soldiers have been mobilized, and only in rare instances have any one of these soldiers been mobilized again involuntarily under current DoD and DA policies.

Current DoD and DA policies have caused the RCs' increasing difficulty in manning their mobilizing units and have, paradoxically, created far less mobilization predictability for individual citizen-soldiers. These policies also run counter to building unit cohesion prior to mobilization, because they cause the RCs continually to seek volunteers to mobilize again or search across all other units to find soldiers that have not yet mobilized to cross-level into mobilizing units. On any given day, any citizen-soldier with mobilization time may well be called away from his/her family and civilian employer on short notice to join a mobilizing RC unit anywhere in the country. When notified, this citizen-soldier usually is ordered to report to this new unit within a few days, even though current policy says 30 days minimum is highly desired, if not required. These short notice mobilization call-ups are disastrous for the retention of affected soldiers and in recruiting new soldiers. Strategic guidance and policy are required immediately from DA and DoD so that the RCs can support ongoing operations in a more efficient and predictable manner in the near term, and also provide more predictable future mobilization windows for their citizen-soldiers. Otherwise, the inability to replenish units with deployable manpower and replace equipment shortages will hamper the RCs' ability to prepare even a fraction of their units for future missions under ARFORGEN.

While it may be time for the RCs to gain even better representation, possibly at the four-star level, in DoD, that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the RCs must continue to manage within their abilities concurrently, while DA and DoD provide timely strategic guidance, policy, and direction needed to manage an operational reserve force that has become such an integral part in fighting this long war.



## ARMY INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGE

Overall, the Army has demonstrated its ability to manage both institutional and operational change successfully since 9/11. The Army Campaign Plan increasingly has become the mechanism whereby the senior Army leaders, like the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff, provide the mission, intent and assign execution responsibilities throughout the Army. Still, the Army needs to focus attention and resources on ARFORGEN implementation for it to work for RC units.

Today, the Army's RCs must be manned and equipped so they can continue to serve as an integral partner in accomplishing the Army's operational requirements. In his testimony before the Senate on the Army's 2006 Posture Statement, Army Secretary Francis Harvey stated, "[I]n essence, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are transforming and modernizing from an under-resourced stand-by force to fully equipped, manned, and trained operational ready units."<sup>26</sup> This is an obvious acknowledgement of past practices, with a much different plan for the future of the RCs. The Army leadership seems intent on building deployable RC units that, like their AC counterparts, are fully manned, trained, equipped, and led for the missions they will face in the this long war. It is important that this commitment be extended to all RC units, not just those select RC units that are aligned in a DEF. Otherwise, the majority of RC units will still be considered unready "ducks" in a newer version of the tiered readiness system.

Figure 6 shows a conceptual depiction of how the Army has moved its RCs toward a more operational reserve force over the last several years. To attain the more operational reserve force it requires, the Army needs to move the RCs up to top right of this graph. The lower left corner is the most undesirable location and reflects having a purely strategic reserve, where change in both the institutional (vertical axis) and operational Army (horizontal axis) are very low. Moving from a low point to a high point along only one axis will increase marginally the RCs' ability to serve as an operational reserve. The most desirable action, however, is to move to a higher location along both axes, which represents a high degree of change in both the institutional and operational Army. Specific changes required will be addressed in the following sections.




Figure 6. A Conceptual DA Institutional and Operational Change Continuum for Managing their Reserve Components.

On 9/11, the Army's RCs were at point A on the graph, where both institutional and operational change were low and thus resulted in a strategic reserve that was not very capable of being employed as an operational reserve. Over the next 4 years, the Army moved to point B, where change in the Operational Army (movement right along the horizontal axis) had increased significantly to a relatively high point. An example representing this high degree of operational change is the tremendous number of soldiers and pieces of equipment that were cross-leveled into undermanned and underequipped RC units and then quickly trained and validated for deployment to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OIF. Similarly, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have implemented institutional changes such as reducing force structure allowance and establishing a Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students account. Both of these actions will allow RC units to achieve and maintain higher manning and readiness levels. Point C on the graph represents where the Army must transition to over the next several years. Moving from point B to C requires a much higher degree of change in the institutional Army. These changes are discussed in detail next.

### **Institutional Army Change.**

DA must update and implement several institutional Army functions to better manage the RCs. These functions include structuring, manning, equipping, training, and resourcing RC units. Developing an integrated method and supporting automated systems that seamlessly can plan, direct, prioritize, and synchronize these functions across both the AC and RCs are integral components for overall success. Aside from manning the force, the institutional Army's biggest challenge will be trying to program and resource a force structure effectively multiple years into the future, all while the operational Army uses ARFORGEN to source the immediate and near-term force requirements of combatant commanders.

*Structure.* The Army needs to identify a structure for the RCs that represents their anticipated deployment needs for this current war, while also considering what will be needed for the next major conflict. This structure obviously needs to be based on the type and number of RC units needed in the modular force.<sup>27</sup> It also must be matched to the type and number of RC units that the Army desires to maintain continually in the ARFORGEN available force pool. As an oversimplified example, the Army could not structure the RCs with only four civil affairs battalions if it requires three of them to always be deployed or remain in that 1-year-long ARFORGEN available force pool at all times. This, in turn, will reduce the fluctuation in those skills needed to recruit, train, and retain in RC units. As a first step in developing a notional force-sizing construct, the Army force management community might simply match current and anticipated force requirements with the ARFORGEN deployment planning goals of one deployment in 3 years for AC forces and one deployment every 6 years for RC forces.

*Manning.* Clearly the most difficult challenge for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard will be manning their units with trained and qualified soldiers. Excessive soldier cross-leveling into deploying units over the last 4 years, the geographic constraints associated with assigning citizen-soldiers to units, low full-time support (FTS) manning, and the chronic and growing shortages in company grade officers across both RCs hamper the RCs' ability to man units.

Manning units is the center of gravity for ARFORGEN to work for the RCs. Currently, no comprehensive manning strategy is in place in either the Army Reserve or Army National Guard that can support the ARFORGEN cyclic unit rotation model. There should be a focused RC unit life cycle manning plan for each RC unit in ARFORGEN that specifically has targeted recruiting and retention incentives and affiliation bonuses set for that unit. Minimally, when an RC unit enters the ARFORGEN ready force pool, in either a DEF or REF, it should do so fully manned with soldiers that are all contracted for service throughout the remainder of that cyclic rotation. Fully manning RC units in this manner is essential to provide trained, ready, and cohesive RC units for deployment.

Unlike AC units, no centralized RC personnel assignment and replacement system exists. Essentially everything related to RC unit assignments is decentralized and based on geographic proximity. A citizen-soldier usually affiliates with a particular RC unit based on the geographic proximity to his/her home. Similarly, vacancies in an RC unit also are a function of not having a qualified soldier within the local area or within a reasonable commuting distance. An effective RC unit life cycle manning plan needs incentives targeted to fill vacancies, especially those caused by geographic constraints. Accordingly, Army policies and resources should allow the RCs to:

- Fully man all RC units in ARFORGEN on a time-based unit life cycle of 6 years<sup>28</sup>;
- Fund travel costs for all training of soldiers who live outside a reasonable commuting distance from an RC unit;
- Pay a substantial bonus to any soldier willing to retrain into another specialty that resides within commuting distance of an RC unit vacancy;
- Increase and fund full-time manning levels to 100 percent of requirements in RC units; and,
- Find ways to reduce and eliminate the growing company grade officer shortage.

The Army needs to man all RC units in ARFORGEN fully on a time-based unit life cycle of 6 years. Doing this synchronizes the manning function with the ARFORGEN cyclic rotation goal of one deployment in every 6 years for RC units. This also will require RC units to move through the Reset/Train and Ready force pools based on time, not just an event as currently planned. The Available force pool is already a time-based pool of up to 1 year if units are not deployed sooner. Fully manning RC units is so challenging and crucial to achieving unit cohesion and effective collective training that this proposal should be a readily accepted modification to the ARFORGEN model.


Funding travel costs for all training of soldiers that live outside a reasonable commuting distance from an RC unit will help to fill vacancies in that ARFORGEN designated unit. This is especially critical to fill key leader and staff positions as early as possible—even when the RC unit enters the Reset/Train force pool, and increasingly more important for all other remaining vacancies as an RC unit nears the Ready force pool.

Similarly, the Army needs to pay a substantial bonus to any soldier, willing to retrain into another specialty, who resides within commuting distance of an RC unit yet does not possess the specialty required for any vacancy in that unit. For instance, if the Army Reserve needs truck drivers to fill vacancies in a transportation company being formed in Utah, then it should be able to offer a retraining bonus of, say \$6,000, to other soldiers in low demand specialties who reside nearby. Doing so also would reduce the travel costs incurred to pay qualified soldiers who join a unit and live outside a reasonable commuting distance. The Army Reserve has started doing this to a limited extent with selected soldiers it needs to retrain into high-demand, critical-skill specialties. These retraining bonuses, however, are not specifically tied to soldiers living near these vacancies. In addition to its limited availability, this retraining bonus is only \$2,000, so it is not going to be very attractive to a large number of soldiers.<sup>29</sup>

The Army needs to increase and fund full-time manning levels to 100 percent of authorized requirements in RC units. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard have the lowest proportion of full-time manning among all the other reserve services.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, even though not authorized the number of full-time support (FTS) personnel necessary to meet its requirements, the number of full-time personnel available for duty is being reduced further because of departures related to other ongoing requirements for these active duty and reserve personnel.<sup>31</sup> By remedying this situation, FTS in the Army's RCs will be on par with all other reserve services and will not continually be drained for other missions. Full-time manning enhances RC unit readiness and is necessary for success in the high operational tempo environment RC units have experienced since 9/11. Minimally, every RC unit in

ARFORGEN should to be assigned all of its full-time manning before it reaches the Ready force pool. Historically, both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have not been authorized all of the full-time support staff they require because, under the tiered readiness system, it was assumed that many units would not need to deploy quickly, and thus the risk associated with lowered unit readiness was acceptable. This risk is no longer acceptable for RC units in ARFORGEN.

Finally, the Army will never have the leaders it needs to man RC units adequately unless it finds ways to reduce and eliminate the growing shortage of company grade officers. This shortage—crucial in manning and readying RC units that will be called upon to deploy—is becoming an increasingly vulnerable center of gravity for the Army. Figure 7 depicts this shortage of captains and lieutenants in RC units over the last 10 years.<sup>32</sup> Both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have a severe shortage of captains. At the end of fiscal year 2005, this shortage was 10,619 officers. Essentially, this shortage came about as a result of low accessions and poor company grade officer management over at least the last 10 years.<sup>33</sup> These officers fill vital small unit leadership and other key staff positions.



**Figure 7. The Reserve Components Shortage of Company Grade Officers Over Time.**

Minimally, it will take another decade of deliberate actions to overcome this shortage if the Army immediately starts to recruit significantly more officers and retains a greater percentage of the company grade officers that it has. This means increasing the annual number of lieutenants it accessions into the RCs through all sources, which include the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and direct commissions. The Army is providing many incentives to retain its AC company grade officers.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, it is decreasingly less likely that company grade officers leaving active duty will join an RC unit. This trend needs to be reversed quickly. Though a \$6,000 affiliation bonus is available to encourage AC officers to transition to RC units, in reality it was too late to be implemented and it also is too small to attract any meaningful participation.<sup>35</sup> Why would a captain leaving active duty after repeated year-long deployments to Iraq want to join an RC unit, and then be highly vulnerable to being called right back as a cross-leveled asset for yet another deployment with any RC unit because he/she technically has no mobilized time as a newly-arrived RC soldier? A combination of thoughtful policy and greater incentives can reverse this dangerous trend. An alternate strategy used regularly and effectively by the Marines might be to assign hundreds of AC company grade officers to RC units. It has the dual benefit of filling critical shortages in RC units while AC officers benefit from the experience of an RC assignment early in their career.<sup>36</sup>

*Equipping.* Long before 9/11, the RCs were short of equipment. The high operational tempo since then has only exacerbated a bad situation. Late in 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) made the following observations on the plans needed to improve equipment readiness in the Army National Guard.

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment, and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles.<sup>37</sup>

The Army's sound plan in place to equip deploying RC units provides them adequate training equipment in the ramp up prior to those deployments. The most critical challenge here will be equipping the Army National Guard, so it can fulfill its dual state role in homeland security and defense missions while at home station. In the past, when the Army National Guard stayed at home as a strategic reserve, governors could turn to them whenever they needed troops for disaster relief or security. Increasingly, these Guard units have little or no equipment for long periods of time after returning home from overseas deployments.

Obviously, the answer to RC equipping troubles is to buy more critically short equipment over time. These equipping expenses might be optimized and minimized by a more predictable ARFORGEN rotation cycle of one deployment every 6 years, combined with expanded state-to-state agreements that allow for temporary sharing and/or transfers of equipment needed for those dual missions while at home station.

*Training.* The Army is undertaking a paradigm shift in unit training and readiness as it implements ARFORGEN. Unit training, and the readiness reporting related to that, will move from the AC band of excellence and RC tiered readiness concept to one of progressive and increasing capability over time. FORSCOM is now developing and validating unit training and readiness templates for all types of units, both AC and RC, that will be managed in ARFORGEN.<sup>38</sup> The Army also desires to move RC units away from the alert-mobilize-train-deploy scenario that has been so common to date to one where RC units only need to train-alert-deploy.<sup>39</sup> As the Army moves to this new paradigm, it must align and integrate RC units against future missions as early as possible and fully man them before they undergo collective training.

FORSCOM must align and integrate RC units against future missions as early as possible in ARFORGEN. Aligning RC units against future missions early allows the individual RCs to prioritize resources for these select RC units, so they are fully manned and minimally equipped before they undergo pre-mobilization collective training. It also is important that RC units be integrated early into the task organization they expect to deploy under. For example, if FORSCOM minimally task organizes all AC and RC units within the DEF, then these AC and RC units can train together before being deployed. Similarly, wherever possible, FORSCOM should tentatively align AC and RC units in the REF and CEF force packages.

... Because both of the USAR units were significantly under strength before being deployed to Iraq, they received many soldiers from other USAR units country-wide to fill up their ranks. This process is known as "cross-leveling." Although it has the benefit of filling the ranks, it has the disadvantage of inserting soldiers into units shortly before deployment who had never trained with those units. The soldiers did not know the unit. The unit and the unit leadership did not know the soldiers. The Army has always stressed "you train as you fight." As COL [deleted] began to focus his efforts on interrogation operations, all he had were disparate elements of units and individuals, including civilians, that had never trained together, but now were going to have to fight together.

Foremost among training reforms is the necessity to man RC units fully before they can undergo any meaningful collective training. RC units that are not fully manned early in the ARFORGEN process always will remain frozen in that alert-mobilize-train-deploy scenario. Since 9/11, the RCs have needed to increase the manning levels of almost all of their deploying units significantly, and that, in turn, required extensive collective training after these units mobilized. This has not always resulted in a positive outcome, as the excerpt above from the Article 15-6 *Report on the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal* indicates.<sup>41</sup> Significant training and manning level increases also were required in RC units that mobilized during the first Gulf War in 1990-91.<sup>42</sup> Currently, the only way the RCs can fully man units, short of soldiers volunteering, is via soldier cross-leveling actions that can only begin after DA publishes a unit's alert order. RC units will never be able to transform to a train-alert-deploy scenario unless they achieve unprecedented levels of pre-mobilization training, and that depends on fully manning a unit long before it is alerted. One recent paper suggests that the Army look to apply Lean Six Sigma techniques to the RC unit training process, where unit manning and equipping are viewed as "suppliers" to the collective training process.<sup>43</sup> This novel approach might be the impetus needed for the Army to achieve higher collective training proficiency in RC units prior to alert.

*Resourcing.* The RCs currently are not resourced to serve as an operational reserve. The tiered readiness system that provided more resources to high priority units and much less to others has been thrown out; however, nothing has replaced it. The budgeting cycle needs to be well ahead of the unit manning, equipping, and training functions for RC units, or otherwise crisis management prevails during the period shortly before mobilization. If the ARFORGEN sourcing process identifies RC units early, then, ideally, funding already has been programmed and is in place on R-Day when an RC unit enters the Reset/Train force pool. Minimally, necessary funding must precede an RC unit's movement from the Reset/Train into the Ready force pool. This resourcing process also needs to be dynamic enough to adjust to changing ARFORGEN requirements that, for instance, cause a corresponding unit move from the CEF to the DEF.

### **Operational Army Changes.**

While shaping and rapidly implementing institutional Army decisions that pertain to RC units and personnel policies, the operational Army also should communicate anticipated RC unit force requirements back up to the institutional Army. Changes the operational Army needs to make include communicating better with the institutional Army, developing robust automation support for all aspects of ARFORGEN, and increasing the planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

Communication between the operational Army and the institutional Army is the single biggest area for change. This is especially important on all issues and/or decisions related to RC unit mobilization and individual RC soldier mobilization policies. Often times, these policy decisions seem to occur in a vacuum, are not properly informed by operational Army input, or there seems simply to be a breakdown in communications between senior operational Army uniformed leaders and senior institutional DA civilians. For example, while operating within the current Partial Mobilization authority, a senior military member might view no restrictions on mobilizing an RC soldier, who, by his very presence in uniform, is considered a volunteer. On the other hand, a senior civilian counterpart is likely to view this mobilization action in an entirely different manner, requiring extensive proof that this soldier either had not previously mobilized since 9/11, or be provided a signed volunteer statement from this soldier specifically agreeing to another mobilization. Where the operational Army sees no issue, the institutional Army consumes valuable RC unit time preparing and staffing these documents. This is especially cumbersome for the RC unit alert and mobilization orders processing system.<sup>44</sup>

The Army also must develop robust and integrated automation support that covers all aspects of the ARFORGEN process. This includes automation support that synchronizes the planning, resourcing, sourcing, manning, equipping, training, and mobilizing functions that are all related and interconnected in ARFORGEN. This web-based automation support needs to be integrated, minimally, across Headquarters DA, FORSCOM, Training and Doctrine Command, First Army, and the headquarters of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

ARFORGEN automation support also needs to be integrated with other well-established institutional Army processes like the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. This is probably the area of greatest challenge because ARFORGEN is designed to meet the operational deployment requirements of combatant commanders who are only looking about 18 months out at best, and often need forces within only a few weeks of presenting a new request for forces. Contrast these short combatant commander timelines with institutional process like TAA, and one can quickly see these processes are not influenced by sharp increases up or down in force requirements. This is especially problematic with HD/LD units and/or specialty force requirements, like military police, where institutional Army processes might have assumed risk years ago by not choosing to source these type units in sufficient quantities that are needed today to meet current combatant commander requirements. ARFORGEN, and the automation support developed for it, should inform and shape institutional Army processes. Recently, the Army said that it would develop what it is calling the ARFORGEN Synchronization Tool (AST) and integrate automation systems to better support information management.<sup>45</sup> This is a very promising sign, even though it will take years to develop and implement such a tool.

The last way the operational Army can better integrate RC units in ARFORGEN is to increase the planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. Practical ways of doing this would be to assign RC units to a DEF expeditionary force package as early as possible, with 3 years out or more before that deployment being the optimal. Being in a DEF, verses the REF or CEF expeditionary force packages, provides a definite deployment window for RC units to backward plan against.

If ARFORGEN is to work for RC units, the Army must make these institutional and operational changes. Changes in these structuring, manning, equipping, training, and resourcing functions, combined with better communication and automation, will posture the Army for success. The Army's best efforts will only result in marginal success in integrating RC units in ARFORGEN unless there is commensurate change within DoD.

## **DOD INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGE**

The role of our Reserve forces is changing in the United States. We have seen their traditional role, which was to serve as manpower replacements in the event of some cataclysmic crisis, utterly transformed. They are no longer serving as the force of last resort, but as vital contributors on a day-to-day basis around the world.<sup>46</sup>


Charles Cragin, the then serving Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, made the remarks above in 2000, more than a year before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. He was acknowledging that the state and nature of America's military had been shaped profoundly by the end of the Cold War, the corresponding reduction in the size of the military, and the dramatic increase in the number of missions the military was being called upon to perform. Mr. Cragin went on to say that the military had been able to accomplish more missions than ever by relying increasingly on the reserve components and predicted "this will continue for the foreseeable future—this will be steady state from now on" because "we simply cannot get the job done without them."<sup>47</sup> Six years later Cragin's comments are more relevant than ever—and probably far beyond what anyone could have predicted or imagined at



that time. Nothing significant has yet been done to overhaul the policies and directives needed to fund and manage the RCs as an integral day-to-day contributor to our national defense.

To complete the transition to an operational reserve, institutional and operational change at the DoD level is needed. The combination of smaller active services and increased operational tempo necessitate more frequent and routine use of RCs. This is especially true for the Army, where the percentage of reserve manpower and total number of RC soldiers far exceeds any other service, and the Army's operational tempo is expected to remain high for many more years.

Figure 8 shows the conceptual DA institutional and operational change spectrum (shown earlier in Figure 6) superimposed on the DoD institutional and operational change spectrum. The intent here is to illustrate that DA's best efforts to move its RCs from a strategic to an operational reserve will result only in marginal increases without similar changes at the DoD level. If Army makes all of the previously mentioned institutional and operational changes, it will only get its RCs to point C on this graph. DoD institutional and operational change is required to move the Army's RCs from point C to D, where they can truly be managed and employed as an operational reserve. These DoD changes are discussed in detail next.



**Figure 8. The Institutional and Operational Change Spectrum as it Pertains to Moving the Army's Reserve Components from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve.**

#### **DoD Institutional Change.**

DoD needs to make the following institutional changes so that Army can implement ARFORGEN for its RCs:

- Provide the Army better and timelier mobilization strategic guidance, and then let it manage within that authority;
- Focus DoD implementation policy on the long-term requirements needed to fight this long war;



- Focus less on individual servicemember and RC unit decisions; and,
- Provide additional resources to the Army's RCs.

*Provide the Army Better and Timelier Mobilization Strategic Guidance, and then Let it Manage within that Authority.* The Army needs timely strategic guidance and policy, as well as greater autonomy to manage within that authority, for ARFORGEN to work for RC units. The GAO made the following observations related to this in 2004.

Many of DoD's policies that affect mobilized reserve component personnel were implemented in a piecemeal manner and were not linked within the context of a strategic framework to meet the organizational goals. Overall, the policies reflected DoD's past use of the reserve components as a strategic force rather than DoD's current use of the reserve component as an operational force to respond to the increased requirements of the Global War on Terrorism. Faced with some critical shortages, the policies focused on the short-term needs of the services and reserve component members rather than on long-term requirements and predictability.<sup>48</sup>

The findings from this GAO report are just as relevant or more so today, some 16 months after its publication. Many of DoD's existing policies that affect mobilized Army Reserve and Army National Guard units and soldiers continue to be either absent early on or are implemented in a piecemeal manner that is not linked within the strategic context of this long war.

DoD needs to provide the Army well-thought-out and more timely strategic guidance. Foremost is the need to provide mobilization guidance to the services on how their RCs can be utilized to fight this protracted war. Will the mobilization authority for the next several OIF/OEF rotations be a continuation of the partial mobilization (PM) declared by the President on September 14, 2001, that has been in existence for over 4 years now? If so, then DoD should address the growing disconnect between that PM authority and the DoD policy constraint related to it. For example, PM, covered under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 12302, states a maximum of mobilization period of 24 consecutive months, but DoD policy limits this to only 24 cumulative months.<sup>49</sup> It has been 4 1/2 years since this PM was declared, and still no new guidance is out. For Army to manage its RCs adequately, it needs new DoD guidance in this area.

Will DoD decide to move away from PM and use a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority instead? If so, then when and how will this transition period begin? Will DoD obtain legislation to increase the PRC duration from 270 to 365 days.<sup>50</sup>? Answers to these fundamental questions also are required for the Army to manage its RCs like the operational reserve that they have become.

This situation is complicated further by an unwillingness to differentiate a soldier's mobilized time under either PRC or PM since on or shortly before 9/11. When will the Army receive new guidance and/or authority from DoD so that ARFORGEN can function for the Army's RCs on the minimal planning, sourcing, and resourcing horizons needed to be successful? When will DoD provide instructions on how a Soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine resets his/her mobilization clock? This guidance needs to come soon for the Army's RCs. Timely mobilization policy is critical for the Army to man, resource, and train those RC units adequately under the ARFORGEN process.

Once DoD has provided the Army better and more timely strategic guidance and direction on RC mobilization, it should let Army fully manage and execute within that authority. This translates into setting mobilization caps and policy that allow the Army to man and mobilize cohesive RC units, not just individual citizen-soldiers.

## Focus DoD Implementation Policy on the Long-Term Requirements Needed to Fight This Long War.

DoD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DoD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DoD changed a number of its personnel policies to increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DoD's organizational goals to fight the Global War on Terrorism.<sup>51</sup>

If the DoD policy of 24 months cumulative mobilization time remains in effect, versus the legal 24 consecutive months, the Army will never be able to mobilize involuntarily RC soldiers that have been previously mobilized. This is of special concern because the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff recently said at the Association of the U.S. Army annual conference that, for the indefinite future, Army units would continue to spend 1 year "boots-on-the-ground" in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>52</sup> Therefore, the only courses of action left are either a wholesale withdrawal of RC units participating in these operations, or continued ad hoc manning actions where RC units literally are put together from soldiers cross-leveled across the entire force. To pursue either course would be near-sighted and self-defeating, and would negate the very basis for implementing ARFORGEN. New mobilization implementation policy and guidance are required from DoD for ARFORGEN to work for the Army's RCs.

In their September 2004 report, GAO was critical of the DoD and service policies that encouraged the use of paid unit volunteers and generally discouraged the involuntary mobilization of unpaid Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members. The GAO stated "these policies were disruptive to the integrity of Army units because there was a steady flow of personnel among units" as soldiers were cross-leveled from nonmobilizing units into mobilizing units, and then those nonmobilizing units were later called to mobilize.<sup>53</sup> The Army soon will find itself in a new, yet similar, dilemma when attempting to mobilize an RC unit. The twist this time will be that an RC unit will be at or over 100 percent strength; however, the individual mobilization history of each assigned soldier will span anywhere from 0 to 24 months. What soldier deploys or stays behind in this situation? If it has been 4, 5, or even 6 years since an RC soldier completed a mobilization, at what point can he/she be required to mobilize again under a new or existing authority? Current DoD policy fails to address this, other than to say no involuntary remobilizations and no more than 24 months cumulative mobilization time under the PM that has been in effect since September 14, 2001. The Army Reserve recently conducted an analysis that accounted for all of these DoD restrictions and concluded that almost two-thirds of their citizen-soldiers remaining for involuntary mobilization were recently recruited soldiers in the lowest enlisted grades of E1 to E4. The Army Reserve also concluded that, even after extensive retraining of all remaining soldiers who had not yet mobilized, they still would be "completely dependant on volunteerism" to fill their leadership requirements in higher grades (E5 to E9 and O1 to O6) that they projected to mobilize in fiscal year 2006.<sup>54</sup> This clearly shows the need now for new and specific DoD mobilization implementation policy and guidance, so the Army can plan, man, and resource an increasing level of RC unit readiness well before these units are called to mobilize and deploy.

*Focus Less on Individual Servicemember and RC Unit Decisions.* As an institution, DoD's focus should be less on individual servicemember and individual RC unit management issues, and more on strategically thinking and planning for the future. Reserving minor decisions for high-level decisionmakers is neither efficient nor effective. It causes unneeded delays, suggests mistrust of others, and hampers decentralized execution. These decisions should be decentralized to Army as long as they are within current policy.

Another area that needs far less DoD focus is the insistent pursuit and expansion of individual volunteerism. The luster of volunteerism wore off long ago in the Army's RCs. Simply put, the Army cannot fight a protracted war if volunteerism becomes the nation's primary means of mobilizing and deploying RC units. Volunteerism is increasingly less capable of filling the strategic guidance void on mobilization authority and the new DoD implementation guidance needed to fight this long war. While volunteerism may be expedient politically, it places unneeded obstacles in the way of operational planners by increasingly hindering the Army's ability to form and deploy cohesive RC units. As General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, recently testified, this results in "cobbling together" units, "but more importantly, you are putting the burden [of fighting this war] on the Soldier." He goes on to say that "these Soldiers are volunteers" and that "we should not put that burden on them because that breaks up unit integrity, it breaks up unit cohesiveness, and it breaks up the leadership."<sup>55</sup> Volunteerism may work well for filling the increasing individual staffing needs of stateside administrative headquarters. It fails to work when trying to build and train cohesive RC units for deployments to OIF and OEF.

Additionally, tracking the mobilization clock of every RC servicemember is not a valuable metric for gauging when to publish new strategic mobilization policy. For example, a recent OSD chart showed only 46 percent of the total 829,005 selected reserve force had ever been mobilized since 9/11, and the other 54 percent had not mobilized to date.<sup>56</sup> This metric does not account for the different individual RC services and also the geographic constraints that limit an RC soldier's ability to affiliate with any unit within his/her RC service. It also presumes that every RC soldier, from private to colonel and in any specialty, is a perfectly interchangeable mobilization asset for any position in an RC unit. Lastly, it is an educated guess at best, because the Army has no personnel system that tracks RC soldier mobilization time. Since 9/11, the Army's RCs have been able only to provide educated guesses on this by divining information from their soldier's pay files in the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS).

*Provide Additional Resources to the Army's RCs.* The nation and DoD will field the quality of RC force that it resources. All of the service RCs combined constitute 43 percent of the total force, yet only account for 7 percent of its budget.<sup>57</sup> In short, DoD must provide additional resources to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. Having an operational reserve is more expensive than a strategic one. It entails more frequent mobilizations, combined with the expectation that RC units maintain higher levels of readiness so that they are able to deploy quickly. Of all the services, this need for additional resources is greatest in the Army's RCs because, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, service composition and size does matter. The Army has accounted for over 72 percent of all troops mobilized to date. It has the largest number of RC soldiers, significantly larger than any other service. Combine this with the fact that a greater percentage of Army's total manpower resides in its RCs, and one can quickly conclude that the Army requires more resources be devoted to its personnel, equipment, and training readiness. Because much of it was already underequipped, undermanned, and under-resourced, no significant cost savings will be achieved after the Army's RCs have completed their force structure reductions. Over time, as current critical shortages in RC equipment and personnel are overcome, it will be easier to manage costs as RC units progressively increase in readiness as they move through the ARFORGEN cyclic rotation.

## **DoD Operational Change.**

The DoD operational chain of command, best represented as the Joint Staff, should aid in shaping and informing DoD institutional decisions that pertain to RC use, while it also works to establish a better system to manage and execute its Joint Force Provider (JFP) responsibilities.

The DoD operational chain of command needs to communicate better with the institutional chain of command. There are essentially two separate chains of command in DoD that terminate at the Office of

the Secretary of Defense: the operational chain that runs from combatant commanders to the Joint Staff, and the administrative chain that runs from the secretary of each service and agencies to the OSD. The operational chain of command is comprised largely of military members, whereas the administrative chain is comprised mostly of civilians. The Joint Staff should shape and inform OSD discussions related to the employment of RC units and those policies it derives controlling it. In effect, this means being more engaged and involved in policy discussions and debates, so DoD institutional policy decisions related to the RCs more reflect their operational use.<sup>58</sup>

On March 11, 2004, the Secretary of Defense directed implementation of the Global Force Management (GFM) process and gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for developing policy and guidance in support of this effort. In this memo, he also designated the commander of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the primary Joint Force Provider (JFP).<sup>59</sup> The Joint Staff's operational change is to establish a system that can better organize and carry out the chairman's GFM responsibilities. This includes developing and publishing timely GFM policy and guidance, as well as shaping OSD policy related to the employment of RC units. Lastly, the Joint Staff needs to bring JFCOM quickly up to speed in its JFP role, while also developing supporting systems to manage and execute these responsibilities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It is imperative that there be a coordinated approach among DoD, DA, and the individual RCs for RC units to be integrated successfully in ARFORGEN. Continued change in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, as well as institutional and operational changes at both the DA and DoD levels, will be required.

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard must continue to change the culture and expectations associated with reserve service in the 21st century. They also must continue eliminating excessive unit structure so that structure does not exceed authorized end strength, complete rebalancing their force structure, and most importantly, continue to make ready for deployment of their soldiers and units called to mobilize. Both also need to integrate their respective rotational plans fully into ARFORGEN. Lastly, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard should continue to manage within their abilities concurrently, while DA and DoD work to provide the timely strategic guidance, policy, and direction needed to manage their RC units like the operational reserve force that they have become.

When the institutional Army improves the structuring, equipping, training, manning, and resourcing functions, it can better manage RC units. The Army must identify a structure for the RCs that is more representative of their anticipated deployment needs now, while also considering what will be needed in the future. This also will reduce the fluctuation in those soldier skills the RCs need to recruit, train, and retain in RC units. The Army has a sound plan in place to equip deploying RC units; however, it needs to buy critically short equipment quickly and encourage expanded state-to-state equipment sharing so that Army National Guard units can fulfill their dual state role missions while at home station. The Army also must make a paradigm shift in unit training and readiness to implement ARFORGEN in RC units. This will require aligning and integrating RC units against future missions as early as possible and fully manning those RC units well before they are alerted for deployment. The resourcing and budgeting process must occur well ahead of the unit manning, equipping, and training functions for RC units, or crisis management will prevail. This resourcing process also should be dynamic enough to adjust to changing ARFORGEN conditions caused by new force requirements from combatant commanders that must be filled quickly. Of all these functions, manning units is the center of gravity and will prove the most difficult to accomplish. Accordingly, the Army needs new/ revised manning policies and resources in place that should allow the RCs to do the following:

- Fully man all RC units in ARFORGEN on a time-based unit life cycle of 6 years;
- Fund travel costs for all training of soldiers that live outside a reasonable commuting distance from an RC unit;
- Pay a substantial bonus to any soldier willing to retrain into another specialty that resides within commuting distance of an RC unit vacancy;
- Increase and fund full-time manning levels to 100 percent of requirements in RC units; and,
- Find ways to reduce and eliminate the growing company grade officer shortage.

Finally, the Army must synchronize other well-established institutional Army processes like TAA and the PPBE process with ARFORGEN.

The operational Army must be able to shape and rapidly implement institutional Army decisions that pertain to RC units and personnel policies, while it also communicates anticipated RC unit force requirements back up to the institutional Army. Accordingly, the operational Army needs to improve communication with the institutional Army, develop robust automation support for all aspects of ARFORGEN, and increase planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

DoD needs to make the following institutional changes so that Army can implement ARFORGEN for its RCs:

- Provide the Army better and more timely mobilization strategic guidance, and then let it manage within that authority;
- Focus DoD implementation policy on the long-term requirements needed to fight this long war;
- Focus less on individual servicemember and RC unit decisions; and,
- Provide additional resources to the Army's RCs.

Finally, DoD operational changes include the Joint Staff helping to shape and fully inform DoD institutional decisions pertaining to RC use, as well as working to establish a better system to manage and execute its joint force provider responsibilities.

## CONCLUSION

In the long war ahead, the Army has the most compelling need, and the most to gain, in both supporting the DoD effort to move its RCs from a strategic to an operational reserve. Of all the Army's initiatives, implementing ARFORGEN is the most critical. The Army will not be able to fulfill its worldwide force requirements by implementing ARFORGEN for AC units alone. To achieve a campaign quality Army fully with joint and expeditionary qualities, the Army must implement ARFORGEN quickly while also keeping its RCs full partners throughout this process. Fully integrating the Army's RCs into ARFORGEN is both essential and critical for ARFORGEN to succeed. The Army needs institutional and operational change within DA and also at the DoD level to make this happen. This paper detailed those changes required so that the Army can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN.

## ENDNOTES

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2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, [www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf) accessed February 10, 2006, p. 24.
3. Lewis Sorley. "Reserve Components: Looking Back to Look Ahead," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 36, December 2004, p. 22.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, [www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf), accessed February 10, 2006, p. 14.
6. This figure is constructed from data reported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, [www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf), accessed February 10, 2006.
7. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 157.
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10. For a detailed brief on the Army Campaign Plan, see [www.army.mil/thewayahead/acp.html](http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/acp.html), accessed February 10, 2006.
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12. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, Subject: Planning Directive—Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Implementation Plan, March 14, 2006, p. 1.
13. Department of the Army, *The Army Campaign Plan with Change 2*, Washington, DC, August 25, 2005, Annex F, p. F-3.
14. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, pp. 2, 5. It is important to note here that DA simply recognizes the rotation cycle of one deployment every 6 years for any type of RC unit. It does not make a distinction between the Army National Guard's plan, which is one deployment every 6 years, and the Army Reserve's plan that calls for one deployment every 5 years. This would be very problematic if DA were to focus solely on Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams, while it ignored the many smaller sized Army Reserve combat support and combat service support units, which have been in very high demand in both OIF and OEF. This one deployment every 6 years also may be a result of the Secretary of Defense directive to "Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one in every 6 years." See Donald Rumsfeld, July 9, 2003, Memorandum SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces, [www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/quickwins/RebalancingForces.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/quickwins/RebalancingForces.pdf), accessed February 11, 2006.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 5-6. In its Planning Directive for the ARFORGEN implementation plan, the Army assumes that operational requirements and the pace of modular force transformation will not allow the Army to enter ARFORGEN implementation Phase 3 (Objective State) before fiscal year 2009. This is the first point in time where Army believes it generally can achieve its planning goals of one deployment in 3 years for AC units and one deployment in 6 years for RC units. Though not explicitly stated, the timeline in Figure 1 hints that this might not take place until as late as fiscal year 2012.
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17. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, pp. 5-6.
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